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Book Review
ADVANCE TO BARBARIANISM.

By F. J. P. Veale. Appleton,

Wisconsin. C. C. Nelson Publishing Co., 1953. Pp. 297.

$4.50.
This important book is by an English lawyer who had
the courage to publish it in England in 1948 at a time when
it was unpopular to do so. He attacks with vigor the war
trials following World War II and the indiscriminate bombings of that war. And he also attacks the silence of the
press - the "historical blackout", which prevented the public from knowing the facts.
American and English lawyers brought up in the common law ought to have a special feeling of regret for the
principal one of these war trials; namely, the trial held in
Nurnberg. For at Nurnberg, despite its name, an attempt
was made to give the world the impression that the trial
was a judicial one, but many now agree with the author
that this was false. It was not only ex post facto but it
lacked the essential element of jurisdiction. Nor was the
precise nature of the alleged crimes set forth in the various
cases; and the rules of evidence were openly violated.1
What was the genesis of Nurnberg the author asks? It
cannot, he submits, be put down to hot blood, for its trials
and sentences were carried out in cold blood. Field Marshal
Keitel was hanged at Nurnberg October 15, 1946, though
hostilities had ended in 1945 (198).'
In Chapter VII, "Downfall", the author finds the genesis
in the Teheran Conference of 1943 where he states that
Stalin proposed the mass murder of 50,000 leading enemies.
This suggestion was in line with the Marxian ideology for
"... When persons or classes of persons are found who cannot be fitted into such a society, they are 'liquidated', that
is to say, put to death" (144-145). The author gives an awful
example of such "liquidation", namely, the massacre by
the Soviet authorities of the Polish ruling classes in the
Katyn Forest (115, 143). At Teheran, Churchill had qualms
about proceeding as suggested by Stalin but apparently
salved his conscience by having a trial. Ultimately the
' For example, the author says pp. 167-168 ". . . at Nurnberg it was
solemnly laid down that hearsay evidence is sufficient to sustain not merely
an opinion but a conviction in a court of law."
2 For the convenience of the reader, the reviewer has included page references to the text for the thoughts herein summarized.

19541

BOOK REVIEW

American solution was carried out: "Mr. Stalin had his
mass murder and Mr. Churchill had his trial" (142) .3
Upon what legal basis were the Nurnberg trials supposed to rest? The basis was the London agreement of
August 8, 1945, formulated by lawyers of the victorious
powers which included ". . . comprehensive new offenses
so vague and elastic that virtually anyone who had taken
a prominent part on the vanquished side, whether as a
general, an admiral, a civil servant, or a manufacturer of
war material, could be charged with them" (154). The
charges against the accused persons were not for the violation of a code of law but for "failure to comply with recognized practice" (168), and the court was specifically precluded from investigating the conduct of both sides regard"ing such practices. In the case of Admiral Donitz, who had
been charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare, the Court did admit evidence of an order of the British
Admiralty of May 8, 1940, ordering unrestricted submarine
warfare, and of the fact that the United States had waged
unrestricted submarine warfare. This ruling, however, was
exceptional, for in the case of Admiral Raeder, who was
charged with planning and directing an aggressive war
against Norway, the court refused to admit evidence that
the British Admiralty was making similar plans, and Admiral Raeder was convicted of a "war crime" and sentenced
to life imprisonment for doing what the British Admiralty
proposed (169).
In the Nurnberg Judgment the phrase "a war of aggression" was not defined and apparently it only applied to those
on the losing side, and it was said that ". . . the farce of a
trial of vanquished leaders by the victors was itself an
offense against humanity", and was, therefore, a war crime
(176). One of those convicted of war crimes was Alfred
Krupp, the German armament manufacturer who was
charged with having "guilty knowledge" that the German
government was employing slave labor. If America should
happen to be on the losing side in a war, then many of our
8 It will always stand for history that a Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States went to Nurnberg and there appeared as the Chief
Prosecutor of those charged with crimes. The late Chief Justice Stone was
strongly opposed to this, expressing his views in vigorous language, "Jackson
(Justice Jackson) is away conducting his high-grade lynching party in
Nurnberg" and "more like a Carthaginian vengeance than appeal to the
processes of the law" - Alpheus Thomas Mason, Extra Judicial Work for

Judge8: The View8 of Chief Justice Stone, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 210, 213

(1953). In approval of the Nurnberg trials, see: Glueck, The Nuernburg
Trial and Aggressive War, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 396 (1946).
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(able) industrial leaders might readily be charged with war
crimes under such a theory of responsibility.
It should be understood that in pre-Nurnberg days the
term "war crime" was a limited legal term as defined in
the military manuals of all civilized countries. It had to do
with the ill treatment of prisoners, espionage, looting and
similiar acts, "it was never applied to the aims and objects
of those responsible for commencing a war, however indefensible these might be" (148, 176, 205, 228).
In addition to Nurnberg, a great number of other war
trials were held without the attempt being made to give
such trials the appearance of a judicial trial.
Field Marshal von Manstein was put on trial in England
before a military court. He was in command of the German
forces on the Eastern front where Communist Commandos
and the civilian population were engaged in a continuous
and furious struggle, atrocities being committed by both
sides. The charge against him was that he knew or should
have known what was taking place, although, ". .

admit-

tedly he had no authority or power to prevent them" (223224). At his trial the rules of evidence were ignored. The
prosecution offered, together with other so-called evidence,
800 documents which took 20 days to read to the court and
he was duly convicted! (231). Captain Liddell Hart, the
English military author, after remarking how well von
Manstein had come through such a searching examination,
added: "His condemnation appears a glaring example of
either gross ignorance or gross hypocrisy" (236).
Field Marshal Kesselring was convicted of war crimes
before a British military court convened in Venice. He was
held responsible for the shooting of certain hostages and
various partisans and bandits who had been caught operating behind the German lines. Lieut-General Sir Oliver
Leese, Kesselring's opponent in the field, declared that "....

had it been his fate to have been on the defeated side, the
same charges as those brought against Field Marshal Kesselring could have been established against" him. And Viscount Alexander, the allied senior commander in Italy,
added that the war in Italy had been carried out fairly and
"... as well as it could have been done" (209).
The American military trial of Yamashita, the commanding general of the Japanese Army in the Phillippines
resulted in a decision that was sharply criticized by dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court as a departure from
our accustomed ways of justice.4
'In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, di8. op8., 26, 41 (1946).
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The real conquest of the Phillippines began about the
time Yamashita assumed command after the great American naval victory. General MacArthur moved swiftly and
the official report shows that 260,000 Japaneses troops "....
were scattered over the Phillippines but most of them might
as well have been on the other side of the world". A military commission of five army officers was quickly convened
by order of General MacArthur to try Yamashita and he
was charged with failure ". . . to control the operations of
the members of his command". He was forced to trial with
undue haste, being arraigned on October 9th, with the trial
set for October 29th. One hundred and twenty-three alleged criminal actions of separate crimes were put in evidence by the prosecution. The rules of evidence were set
aside and affidavits were frequently used. The military
commission heard 286 witnesses who gave over 3,000 pages
of testimony, and it convicted Yamashita and sentenced him
to death.
The Supreme Court, in denying petitions for habeas
corpus and certiorari, refused to check the military commission, to see if it was properly constituted, if it properly
acquired jurisdiction, and whether it tried the prisoner for
an offense within the laws of war. It found it unnecessary
to consider what due process might require in other situations because the rulings on evidence and mode of conducting the proceedings were subject only to military review.
Justice Murphy, though fully acknowledging that atrocities had been committed, wrote a dissenting opinion, in
which he was joined by Justice Rutledge who also wrote a
separate dissenting opinion. Justice Murphy said:
"In all this needless and unseemly haste there was
no serious attempt to charge or to prove that he committed a recognized violation of the laws of war. He
was not charged with personally participating in the
acts of atrocity or with ordering or condoning their
commission. Not even knowledge of these crimes was
attributed to him. It was simply alleged that he unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of the members
of his command, permitting them to commit the acts of
atrocity. The recorded annals of warfare and the established principles of international law afford not the
slightest precedent for such a charge."5
Ibid, 28.
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As the Justice well said, read against the background of
military events in the Phillippines subsequent to October
9, 1944, the charges amount to this:
"We, the victorious American forces, have done
everything possible to destroy and disorganize your
lines of communication, your effective control of your
personnel, your ability to wage war. In those respects
we have succeeded .... And now we charge and condemn you for having been inefficient in maintaining
control of your troops during the period when we were
so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces
and blocking your ability to maintain effective control... We will judge the discharge of your duties by
the disorganization which we ourselves created in large
part. Our standards of judgment are whatever we wish
to make them."6
The Supreme Court had it in its power in Yamashita's
case to check the military authorities and to assert and uphold the principles of justice on which our American system and government rest. It was a glorious opportunity to
give to the Eastern peoples a concrete example of American
law and justice as distinguished from the crude and revolting practices of the East. We shall never cease to regret that this opportunity was missed.
It is, however, some consolation to note that Yamashita
was represented by able and resourceful American lawyers
who did all they could do to prevent this act of vengeance
determined by the military commission while the blood
was still hot from the Japanese atrocities; and further that
the Court rejected what Mr. Justice Murphy labeled "the
obnoxious doctrine ... to the effect that restraints of liberty
resulting from military trials of war criminals are political
matters completely outside the area of judicial review"'
and did review the jurisdiction and authority of the military
commission.
During the 18 months which followed the termination
of hostilities, no less than 24,000 war trials in various parts
Ibid, 34.

7Ibid, p. 30. In approval of the Supreme Court's action in the Yamashita
case, see Fairman, The Supreme Court On Military Jurisdiction: Martial
Rule in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (1946),

concluding "The Supreme Court, wisely it is believed, has left the responsibility with the executive branch of the Government". A. Frank Reel, one of
the able lawyers who defended Yamashita, has written a book, "The Case
of General Yamashita", reviewed by Mark DeWolfe Howe in 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 1285-87 (1950).
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of Europe are said to have taken place and such trials continued for more than five years (202). To Americans with
knowledge of what happened to our men in Korea held by
the Chinese Communists, it is surely the height of irony
to note that the Chinese Communists have indicated an
intention in due course to subject some of their prisoners
to war trials "in accordance with the principles established
by the international military tribunals of Nurnberg and
Tokyo"! (296).
Discussing bombing, the author finds that strategic
bombing was first conceived by the British Air Ministry as
far back as 1936 and was made official by its decision of
May 11, 1940, which resulted that night in the attack of "18
Whitley bombers on railway installations in Western
Germany". The author attacks this action as being "the
first deliberate breach of the fundamental rule of civilized
warfare that hostilities must only be waged against the
enemy combatant forces" (121, 122).
With every desire to take a humane position, I cannot
agree with the author's view if the raid, in fact, was designed to cripple the enemy's system of transportation.
Justice Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at Nurnberg, explained much later that it was decided at Nurnberg not to
prefer charges of bombing against the Germans because of
the difficulty of determining "the military necessity" of
such bombing by both the allied and the German airmen
(175, 190). This again represents the double standard of
the trials and leaves us with no standards. The public had
been led to believe that Hitler had begun terrorist bombing,
such as the bombing of Coventry, but the author says the
facts are conclusive that such bombings were begun by
the British in 1940; the facts being withheld from the public
until 1944.
And here we come to the frightful bombing of Dresden
by 2,000 heavy bombers, British and American, on the
night of February 13, 1945. There is no evidence that this
bombing was a military necessity; and the English Air
Marshal, Harris, apparently attempted to shift the blame
for it (130). The author described it for what it was, ". ..
a wanton act of savagery" after the issue of war had been
decided (167), though it may have accelerated by a short
time the Russian advance (134). The famous old city of
Dresden was virtually destroyed. The dead have been estimated at a quarter of a million people and the burning of
the bodies of these poor unfortunates, many being women
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and children, took weeks to accomplish. The Associated
Press representative at Supreme Headquarters in Paris said
the "allied war chiefs" had decided "to adopt deliberate
terror bombing" of German populated centers in the manner of the Dresden raid (135) .s
In September 1944 at Quebec, Roosevelt and Churchill
sanctioned the infamous Morgenthau Plan involving the
destruction of all industrial plants in Germany and the
flooding of the Ruhr Mines. Roosevelt's cheerful acceptance
of the Morgenthau Plan shows that he felt no compunction
at the idea of reducing by systematic looting and sabotage
a prosperous industrial state of 80 million inhabitants to a
defenseless and poverty stricken agricultural community
(146, 153, 162). This plan of Morgenthau's, if put into practice, would have been a variation of Stalin's "scorched
earth" policy and the author views acceptance of it by an
American President as being not pleasant to contemplate
(121).9
But, comparing our present position, we have had for
sometime accumulated a stock of atomic bombs and the
Russians apparently are gaining on us in this respect. Taking a lead from the Germans who started to put their war
production plants under ground too late, we must suppose
the Russians have accomplished their objective. If the
Russians begin a war by bombing, what can we do in order
to survive? President Eisenhower, a humane man, made
a speech at the United Nations, December 8, 1953, in which
he set forth a plan to try to solve some of the problems
of the atomic age, but in that speech he said that if an atomic
attack was launched against us, ". . . the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste"!
I The American bombing of Hiroshima with the atomic bomb killed 70,000
people, and though Japan's defeat was then inevitable, the author here
accepts that the purpose was to save the lives of American soldiers (31).
However, SOROKIN, in his "RECOSTRUCTION OF HUMANITY" (Beacon Press,
1948) deplores our use of the bomb at Hiroshima.
I As an American, this reviewer resents the author's implication that
civilized warfare Is not for us in this country because of our early experience in fighting savage Indians. In the Valley of Virginia where this reviewer's family lived during the Civil War, the conduct of the Federal
officers was generally correct though depredations were made by the soldiers.
However, towards -the end of the war Sheridan raided the valley and destroyed the grist mills in order to prevent the food supply from reaching
the Confederate Army. It is regrettable to find from BRUCE CAToiN's, A
STILLNESS AT APPOMATOX (Doubleday & Co., 1953), that it was Lincoln's
policy to destroy civilian property and there came, too, the burning of
Columbia, South Oarolina, and the wanton destruction of Sherman's march
to the sea.
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Early in his book the author makes a plea for a return
to the civilized concept that warfare should be the concern
only of the armed combatants engaged (65). This was a
decided change for the better which finally developed in
Europe. The effect of religion in mitigating the harshness
of war was not felt for some time, the Thirty Years' War
having been a war of religion in which "15 million people
perished by violence, starvation or disease". The author
says that the decision to limit and civilize war was a pragmatic one; yet I cannot help but believe that the influence
of Christianity finally made itself felt and that also there
was at least a spark of chilvalry involved (61, 62). Pragmatic reasons most assuredly would suggest outlawing
atomic weapons, but the threat of their use is imminent unless a strong ethical concept comes forward to forestall
them.
In Chapter X, "Orwellian Warfare", the author suggests
that with the advent of mass industry, labor cannot be kept
employed in ordinary business production and that modern
rulers must have wars (cold or hot) to prevent unemployment and to continue their control. President Roosevelt,
he says, found that in 1938 the New Deal had not helped
unemployment for there were still more than 10 million
unemployed; and it is possible, the author suggests, that he
was the first statesman in history to see that unemployment
could be more readily solved in a modern state by the
adoption of a war economy (272, 273). Acceptance of such
materialistic philosophy bodes ill for the future, but hope
may be held for movement of the minds of men toward the
Christian, or other non-material ideals, as the only salvation of the world from self-destruction.
In conclusion the author does not question the motives
of the non-Russians who took part in the Nurnberg trials,
but he does question their wisdom in undertaking so impossible a task. "Should it not have been obvious from the
outset that such appalling miscarriage of justice as the
conviction of Admiral Raeder and such undignified evasions
of the issues as that which took place in regard to the Katyn
Forest Massacre charges would follow naturally and inevitably from the conditions laid down by the Charter?"
(XV).
What defense has been made of the trials? Sir Hartley
Shawcross, Chief British Prosecutor at Nurnberg, on March
28, 1951, asserted that at Nurnberg ". . . certain great principles were for the first time laid down" (245).1 But the
0Cf. footnote

3, supra, article by Glueck.
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author contends persuasively that no principles whatever
can be found from what took place at the trial which, in
fact, amounted to no more than the infliction of vengeance
on the losing side (165, 174). And "... revenge," Churchill
has said, "of all policies is the most pernicious" (261). And
Viscount Maugham, formerly the English Lord Chancellor,
said of the Nurnberg trials, "The Tribunal never purported
to lay down principles for all mankind" (255).
The logical result of such proceedings will be to make
the leaders of the side which appears to be losing more
desperate. These leaders will include not only the military
leaders of such side but also the heads of industrial plants
which produce war materials and, indeed, the political
leaders of the losers as actually took place in the trial and
execution of Premier Tojo of Japan after a trial which
lasted 417 days (204).
If such trials are to be had in the future, the author
concludes that they should surely be conducted by an international tribunal which can consider the "war crimes
of both sides" (264).
Many Americans like Chief Justice Stone," were critical
of the war trials and our participation in them. The late
Senator Robert A. Taft, one of America's ablest and most
respected statesmen, was an outspoken critic of Nurnberg.
All lawyers imbued with the spirit of fairness and justice which pervades the common law should read this
provocative book. While to some, it may seem excessive
in its castigation of all that occurred in the past war trials,"
to others it will stand as a shocking revelation of the "Advance to Barbarism" that occurred during and after World
War II. It is an unpleasant but vivid warning of things to
come unless this advance is halted and forced into retreat.
WALTER
"See footnote 3, supra.
See Review by Schmidt, 22 Ford. L. Rev. 320 (1953).
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